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I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that, in criminal 
cases, an alibi witness's pretrial 
silence regarding information that 
could exculpate a defendant may 
be used to impeach that witness at 
trial. More significantly, the 
court's ruling in Davis v. State, 
344 Md. 331, 686 A.2d 1083 
(1996), established the foundations 
necessary to allow an inquiry into 
the impeachment evidence. This 
decision creates a conditional 
presumption of impaired credi-
bility because of a witness's prior 
silence and places upon a 
defendant the burden of re-
habilitating the witness's credi-
bility. 
The victim of an attempted 
robbery identified Tyrone Davis, 
("Davis") as the offender. Davis 
pleaded not guilty and contended 
that he never attempted to rob the 
victim. Kabacca Bey ("Bey") took 
the stand as an alibi witness for 
Davis. Bey testified that Davis 
was either with him or within his 
view at the time that the officer 
alleged Davis had committed the 
attempted robbery. The prosecu-
tion, in an attempt to impeach Bey 
for not previously informing the 
authorities of this exculpatory 
evidence, cross-examined him, 
exposing that in fact he was not 
with Davis at the time of the 
robbery. 
The Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City found Davis guilty 
of attempted robbery. Davis ap-
pealed the conviction. The Court 
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of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed the decision. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to determine whether the 
trial court had correctly allowed 
cross-examination of the witness 
concerning his failure to inform 
the authorities of exculpatory 
evidence prior to the trial. 
The court began its analysis by 
reviewing the holdings of the 
majority of the courts that have 
considered whether prior silence 
may be the basis for impeachment 
of a witness's testimony at trial. 
Davis, 344 Md. at 335-36, 686 
A.2d at 1085. Those courts have 
recognized that there are instances 
when pretrial silence is relevant to 
an alibi witness's credibility. Id. 
If the "natural impulse" of the 
witness would have been to inform 
the authorities of eXCUlpatory 
evidence, then the witness's failure 
to report such information prior to 
trial would be seen as a prior 
inconsistent statement of that 
witness. Id at 336-37,686 A.2d at 
1085. In the event that a witness's 
pretrial silence is seen as a prior 
inconsistent statement, the use of 
this silence as evidence for im-
peachment purposes would be 
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proper. Id 
The court next faced the 
dilemma of how to establish 
whether this pretrial silence is 
relevant to a witness's credibility. 
Id at 338, 686 A.2d at 1086. 
Although other courts have 
established a list of foundational 
~equirements that the prosecution 
must meet, the court of appeals 
established only limited require-
ments. Id at 343, 686 A.2d at 
1089. In order for the prosecution 
to be allowed to initiate an inquiry 
into the impeachment evidence, 
that party must preliminarily meet 
one threshold requirement. Id at 
338,686 A.2d at 1086. 
The prosecution can meet that 
requirement by laying a foundation 
"that the natural response of the 
witness, assuming the witness was 
in possession of exculpatory 
evidence, would have been to dis-
close that information to the proper 
authorities." Id at 338, 686 A.2d 
at 1086. Moreover, it is the trial 
court's responsibility to conduct a 
hearing to determine if there is 
enough evidence presented by the 
prosecution through direct 
evidence or permissible through 
inference to warrant an inquiry 
into the witness's silence. Id 
Once this requirement is met, the 
prosecution then may cross-
examine the witness regarding the 
pretrial silence. Id at 346, 686 
A.2d at 1090. The burden is thus 
placed on the defendant to rebut 
the prosecution's allegations and 
rehabilitate the witness by explain-
ing the reasons behind the silence. 
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 65 
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Id. Barring an absolute "abuse of 
discretion" the trial court's deter-
mination that the proper founda-
tion has been laid will not be 
overturned. Id at 338,686 A.2d at 
1086. After the foundation has 
been laid and the silence is used as 
evidence for impeachment, it is 
ultimately the trier of fact who will 
determine the credibility of the 
witness's testimony." Id. at 339-
40, 686 A.2d at 1087. 
The court of appeals next 
applied its reasoning to the instant 
case and affirmed Davis's con-
viction. Id. at 348-50, 686 A.2d at 
1091-92. The court determined 
that the prosecution had met its 
burden of demonstrating a rela-
tionship between Davis and Bey, 
and that because of this 
relationship it would have been 
natural for Bey to have informed 
the authorities of exculpatory 
information. Id. at 348-49, 686 
A.2d at 1091. Based on its review 
of the lower court's findings, the 
court of appeals concluded that 
Bey's pretrial silence constituted a 
prior inconsistent statement, and 
affirmed the prosecution's use of 
this silence for impeachment 
purposes. Id. 
Although concUrring with the 
decision in this case, Judge Raker 
expressly denounced the 
majority's premise and the 
application of its newly established 
test in the instant case. Id at 350-
51, 686 A.2d at 1092-93. Judge 
Raker disagreed with the 
majority's assumption that the 
failure of an alibi witness to report 
exculpatory information to the 
authorities necessarily has pro-
27.2 U. Balt. L.F. 66 
bative value in determining that 
witness's credibility. Id. at 350-
51, 686 A.2d at 1092. She rejected 
the test established by the majority 
and instead urged the adoption of a 
test used in other states. Id. at 351-
52,686 A.2d at 1093. In reconcil-
ing her concurrence with the 
majority's holding, Judge Raker 
reasoned that the error of allowing 
the cross-examination had been 
harmless, and thus warranted the 
affirmation of Davis's conviction. 
Id. at 350, 686 A.2d at 1092. 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge 
Eldridge vehemently rejected the 
majority's rationale and asserted 
that with the current distrust of 
government and more specifically 
the police, it is not surprising that 
a potential witness would be 
reluctant to contact the police with 
any information. Id. at 353, 686 
A.2d at 1094. Furthermore, Judge 
Eldridge argued that the relation-
ship between Davis and Bey had 
been shown to be merely that of 
acquaintances, and that it was very 
unlikely that the natural response 
of such an acquaintance would be 
to go to the authorities. Id. at 355, 
686 A.2d at 1095. Judge Eldridge 
maintained that the use of such a 
witness's reluctance against a 
defendant would "create an unfair 
presumption in favor of the state." 
Id. at 357, 686 A.2d at 1095. 
Judge Eldridge concluded that the 
trial court had erred in allowing 
the use of the witness's pretrial 
silence for impeachment purposes. 
Id. at 358,686 A.2d at 1096. 
In Davis v. State, the court has 
established the foundation that the 
prosecution must lay in order to 
conduct an inquiry into the reasons 
for a witness's pretrial silence. By 
establishing such a broad founda-
tion, however, the court has 
facilitated the State's ability to dis-
credit alibi witnesses. All the 
prosecution needs to show is that 
the defendant and the witness are 
mere acquaintances. Thus, the 
burden placed on the defendant to 
rebut this presumption of un-
reliability is an onerous one that 
defense attorneys will have to face 
head on. 
